ASNTS_D_05_2011_28.11.11

 

DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL

 

Reference:      D_05_ 2011               

 

Gender:           Male

                       

Aged:               12                   

 

Type of Reference:     Placing Request         

 

 

 

 

1. Reference

 

The reference received on 17 August 2011 is brought by the Appellant for her son, in terms of Section 18(3) of the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004 (“the Act”) on the basis of a refusal of a placing request for School A (“the specified school”), in respect of school year 2011 to 2012.

 

2. Decision of the Tribunal

 

The Tribunal refuses the placing request and confirms the decision of the Authority, in terms of Section 19(5) (a) (i) of the Act, since the grounds specified in Paragraphs 3(1) (a) (i) and 3(1) (b) of Schedule 2 to the Act exist, and furthermore in terms of Section 19(5) (a) (ii) in all the circumstances it is appropriate to do so. 

 

 

3. Preliminary Issues

 

The hearing was originally arranged for 27 & 28 October but was postponed on application of the authority’s representative on 16 September 2011. Conference calls were held on 17 & 28 October 2011. Notes of the conference calls are contained within the bundle at pages T29-31. On the date of the Hearing the only preliminary issue was a late request by the Appellant’s Solicitor to lodge HMIE reports in respect of both School B (“the nominated school”) and School A (“the specified school”), which was acceded to. 

 

 

4. Evidence:

 

Substantial documentary evidence was produced in a bundle with papers T1-T32, A1-A224 and R1-R164

The Tribunal heard oral evidence. Witnesses for the authority were the authority’s Head of Inclusion who was also the authority’s representative (The Authority Representative), the Depute Head Teacher (Witness A) from the primary school the child most recently attended (School C), a Principal Psychologist from the authority (Witness B) and the Head Teacher from School A (Witness C).

For the Appellant the Tribunal heard evidence from a Clinical Psychologist (Witness D) and the Appellant herself.

Parties were agreed that due to the child’s significant difficulties he was not able to express a view on the placing request.

 

 

5. Findings in Fact:

 

1. The child was born in November 1999 and lives with his mother (the appellant) and elder sibling who is 16.

 

2. The child has autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and complex learning needs (CLN).

 

3. Due to the child’s profound difficulties he is not able to express a view on the placing reference.

 

4. The authority is responsible for the child’s school education

 

5. On entering primary 1 in August 2004 the child attended one of the authority’s schools for children with moderate learning difficulties. The placement continued until the end of the 2007-2008 term.

 

6. The child attended one of the authority’s schools for children with complex learning needs from August 2008 until June 2011.

 

7. The child commenced transition into an Intensive Support Unit at his primary school in February 2009 with the transition being completed in March 2010. There was some initial disruption to the placement but from August 2010 to June 2011 the child’s placement in the unit was settled.

 

 

8. The child’s case was discussed at the authority’s panel on 26 January 2011 and 24 March 2011. The panel determined that School B (“the nominated school”) was an appropriate educational placement for the child’s secondary education.

 

 

1. By applications dated 6 July and 12 July 2011 (R146-149) the appellant made a request to the authority to place her son at School A from the start of the school year in August 2011.

 

10. The authority informed the appellant that the placing request had been refused by letter dated 29 July 2011(A10), the ground for the refusal within the meaning of the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004 was provided to the appellant by letter dated 17 August 2011 (A15).

 

11. The child has not attended school since June 2011.

 

50. School B is run by the Education Authority and caters for children of secondary school age who have additional support needs caused by severe/complex learning needs.

 

1000. School A is a school run by the Education Authority catering for children with autistic spectrum disorders of both primary and secondary school age. The school focuses on language, communication and preparing children for independent living.

 

14. Were the child to attend School A he would be placed in the class themed “enhanced support”. The class currently has five pupils of primary seven to third year level and is currently staffed by two teachers and two pupil support assistants. All pupils within both the class and the school are functioning at a significantly higher cognitive and communication level than the child. The staffing provision has been based around the needs of the children within the class. The school does not have any spare staff capacity.

 

• If the child were to attend School A, it would be necessary for the school to engage an additional teacher. The education authority does not have spare teaching capacity from which an appropriately qualified teacher could be drawn. Consequently it would be necessary for the authority to take an additional teacher into employment. The cost of the additional teacher to the authority would be approximately £50,000 per annum.

 

16. It is important for the child’s development that he has an appropriate peer group of children with similar abilities. No such peer group would be available at School A. The child is at a significantly different level developmentally from other children in the school. There is a risk that a placement within School A could be detrimental to the child’s development.

 

17. Many of the pupils who attend School B have ASD. The child would have an appropriate peer group at School B. School B would be able to meet the child’s needs.

 

 

18. If the child were to attend School A it would be necessary for the authority to employ a pupil support assistant. The cost of the pupil support assistant to the authority would be approximately £23000 per annum salary plus associated on-costs.

 

19. The child does not meet all the admission criteria for School A.

 

 

20. The education normally provided at School A is not suitable to the ability or aptitude of the child

 

4. Submissions for the Parties

 

Written submissions were produced by both parties, which greatly assisted the Tribunal. These written submissions were supplemented by verbal submissions. The submissions are very broadly summarised as follows: -

 

1. Submissions for Respondents

 

The tribunal required to follow a two-stage test. Firstly, determining whether there was a ground for refusal in terms of paragraphs 3(1) or (3) of schedule 2 to the Act and thereafter if the Tribunal was so satisfied whether in all the circumstances it was appropriate to confirm the authority’s decision. Two grounds for refusal were relied on, the first being the ground specified in paragraph 3(a)(i) of Schedule 2 of the Act that placing the child in the specified school would make it necessary to take an additional teacher into employment. Both Witness C and The Authority representative gave evidence that an additional teacher would be required were the child to attend School A.

 

The second ground for refusal relied upon was that the education normally provided at the specified school is not suited to the age, ability and aptitude of the child (paragraph 3(b) of schedule 2 of the Act). In relation to this ground Solicitor for the Respondent referred to the evidence of Witness A and Witness B in relation to the child’s functional level. In the view of the Respondent’s witnesses the child’s main barrier to learning was his complex learning needs. Witness B stated that the children within School A were functioning at a higher level than the child. Witness C did not think any of the pupils at School A were functioning at the child’s level; bearing in mind School A has both primary and secondary children. Witness B gave evidence that the child would not fit within School A and that it was very unlikely that the child will achieve independent living and School A is preparing the children for that. The child’s needs had been well met within the complex learning needs sector, in contrast with his time in a school for children with moderate learning needs. The CLN Panel of 24 March that had made the recommendation that the child attend School B comprised CLN head teachers, a principal educational psychologist and a consultant paediatrician. This panel decided the child’s needs could be best met within School B where there would be individualised planning with regular reviews. Witness A gave evidence that the child had moved for assessment into an intensive support unit within the school and due to a number of factors he had remained there until the end of primary seven. Solicitor for the Respondent suggested that the unit was not necessary to meet the child’s needs given Witness D’s evidence that his behaviour was improving and Witness A’s evidence that his behaviour was not high tariff.

 

Solicitor for the Respondent referred to evidence from Witness C regarding the purpose of School A and the contrast between the child’s needs and those of other children within the school.

 

 

2. Submissions for Appellant

 

Like the Solicitor for the Respondent, Solicitor for the Appellant referred to the two-stage process. First of all the Tribunal requires to be satisfied that the one of the statutory exceptions in schedule 2, paragraph 3 of the act exists and, if so, the Tribunal must use its general discretion in deciding whether in all the circumstances of the case, the local authority’s decision should be confirmed. Initially, at least, the burden of proof lies with the local authority. Solicitor for the Appellant submitted that it was significant that none of the authority’s witnesses, other than Witness A, had met the child and his needs had not recently been properly assessed by the authority. Solicitor for the Appellant submitted that this lack of assessment was critical and he contended that it was not possible to assess provision if the authority does not know what the child’s needs are. There was a wealth of evidence before the Tribunal that the child had moved on since the last PEPr assessment in May 2009 (R62). (PEPr is an assessment and programme planning tool for children with ASD).

 

Solicitor for the Appellant then proceeded to address the evidence of each of the witnesses in turn outlining where he considered the evidence of the authority’s witnesses; should not be relied on; was at times contradictory and why the evidence of Witness D should be accepted including where there was any difference between the evidence of Witness D insofar as it related to the child’s learning profile, progress and cognitive ability. He submitted that Witness D was in the best position of all the witnesses to assess whether or not the child was an appropriate pupil for School A.

 

In relation to the ground that it would be necessary to take an additional teacher into employment it was submitted that the ground referred only to teaching staff and not additional support. The authority had contended that both an additional teacher and a pupil support assistant were required but the basis of this contention was far from clear. The Tribunal must be satisfied that evidence was led on the issue of necessity. The local authority had carried out no baseline assessment for the child and it was not possible to state with any certainty what a child would require in a given setting if his needs are not properly understood. The Authority representative proposed that the child would use his own learning programme despite the fact that both the nominated and specified schools use the TEACCH programme for autistic pupils. Both schools are familiar with PECS (Picture Exchange Communications System). While he recognised that teaching a pupil such as the child is a specialist skill there was no evidence to suggest that the teachers at School A would not have the skill. The matter was, in his submission, swept away with the notion that the teachers in the class would be fully employed with other pupils, but no detailed evidence was led to support this notion. In his submission the case presented by the authority was more one of insistence than detailed evidence showing a careful and reasoned decision. Witness A told the Tribunal that the child was not a “high tariff” pupil and therefore there was nothing in the child’s behaviour that would demand two members of staff to be present. Standing the setup of the class [which the child would attend were he to go to School A] it is much more likely that if additional staff were needed it would be limited to a pupil support assistant. This was submitted on the basis that the intention for the child [in School B] is that he is to enter a class of seven with one teacher and two pupil support assistants. The suggestion is that School B is better set up for a CLN class and therefore the staff ratios can be lower because of greater expertise. It was submitted there was no evidence before the Tribunal with regard to what is on offer at School B. No staff from School B gave evidence and the Tribunal is left in the dark so far as provision for the child at School B is concerned. It is a fundamental contradiction in the authority’s case that the child will need an additional teacher and pupil support assistant in one school and yet will have a relatively low pupil to staff ratio in School B. It was Solicitor for the Appellant submission that this contradiction was never properly resolved and that the case for an additional teacher is not made out.

 

With regard to the ground in paragraph 3(1) (b) it was submitted that the only evidence which could be of any assistance to the Tribunal was that of Witness D. Witness B and Witness C, having never met the child, they could not decide on whether he meets the admissions criteria. It was clear from Witness D’s evidence that the documentation that they were considering was out of date and that the child had made significant progress as reported in the school reports. Witness D’s evidence should be preferred. Witness D gave his evidence objectively and in a straight forward manner and was not critical of either of the schools. It was suggested he is a world expert on autism and gave straightforward evidence to the effect that the child’s primary barrier to learning is his autism. He gave evidence with regard to another patient of his who he assessed as being at a similar cognitive level as the child. While the Tribunal heard of one particular pupil who seemed to have a particular gift in language Witness D confirmed that he was aware of gifted pupils at School A but they were not typical of the profile and that the clinic had contact with a number of pupils at School A who by definition had complex learning needs. In Solicitor for the Appellant’s submission the other witnesses who gave evidence regarding this particular ground have no up-to-date knowledge of the child, have never met him and are not in a position to comment on his ability or aptitude.

 

Accordingly Solicitor for the Appellant’s submission was that there were no statutory circumstances in which the duty to grant the placing request does not apply and that the Tribunal need look no further at this case. Nevertheless if the Tribunal did not accept his position he submitted that in taking account of all the circumstances of the case the Tribunal should refuse to confirm the authority’s decision. The Tribunal should do so for the following reasons: -

 

1. The views of the child’s mother, the appellant, who probably knows the child better than anyone else.
2. The principal barrier to the child’s learning being his autism and School A specialising in communication disorders arising from autism. School B is principally concerned with complex support needs and given School A is more likely to address as a priority the issue of the child’s autism gives the child a better chance of developing educationally.
3. The child’s progress over recent months. The classroom model offered by School A is one tried for the child previously.
4. The likelihood that standing the child’s academic history it is likely that additional staff are going to have to be put in place at some stage in the future. The appellant is concerned that there are no realistic prospects the local authority will do so voluntarily and gains the child has made will be lost.

 

 

 

 

 

6. Reasons for Decision

 

Paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 2 to the Act provides: -

 

“Where the parent of a child having additional support needs makes a request to an education authority to place the child in the school specified in the request, being a school under their management, it is the duty of the authority, subject to paragraph 3, to place the child accordingly”.

 

Accordingly, the Tribunal first considered whether a ground for refusal of the Placing Request in terms of paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the Act could be sustained. As indicated above the authority argued that two grounds contained within paragraph 3 were established, namely that placing the child in the specified school would make it necessary for the authority to take an additional teacher into employment (paragraph 3(1) (a) (i) of Schedule 2 to the Act) and that the education normally provided at the specified school is not suited to the age, ability or aptitude of the child (paragraph 3(1) (b) of schedule 2 to the Act).

 

Considering the ground for refusal specified in paragraph 3(1) (a) (i) the Tribunal accepted Solicitor for the Appellant’s submission that this ground referred only to teaching staff. Relevant evidence was heard, from both the authority’s Head of Inclusion and the Head Teacher from School A.  They gave evidence that classes at School A are created on the basis of need and that staff are allocated to the classes on the basis of that need. Any additional children placed in classes would necessitate the employment of extra staff. If the Tribunal were to grant the placing request the child would enter a class currently containing five pupils with four allocated staff, two teachers and two pupil support assistants. Cognitively all pupils currently within that class were significantly ahead of the child. The child would not have any peer within the class or the school. Consequently additional staff would be required to support the child and this would include a teacher. Witness C, the Head Teacher, did not believe staff within the school would be able to work with the child. Children within the school are all at a different stage of PECS and come in with an ability to use the symbols and communicate using them. PECS is not used in a very structured way like in a CLN school.

 

The Authority representative gave evidence to the effect that the Education Authority did not have a pool of staff from which a teacher with the necessary skills could be drawn. No evidence was available that contradicted the evidence that an additional teacher was necessary. It was, however, argued that because there had been no recent baseline assessment for the child it was not possible to state with any certainty what support would be required and accordingly the authority’s evidence on this point should not be accepted. The Tribunal did not accept this argument. Witness C gave evidence as to the information that she considered in coming to a view on the child’s needs which convinced her that an additional teacher was necessary. She had spoken to the child’s mother, examined the school report dated 22 June 2011(A141-A144) and considered the child’s Additional Support Plan (“ASP”) that commenced on 9 September 2010 (A112-A124). The report concludes that the child had met all the targets in his ASP. The Tribunal considered that while an up to date assessment of the child’s abilities would have been useful, as would a revised ASP, there was sufficient information available to Witness C to enable her to come to a view that if the child were to attend her school an additional teacher would be necessary.

 

As indicated above, no evidence being available that contradicted the evidence of Witness C and The Authority representative on this issue and the Tribunal not accepting Solicitor for the Appellant submission that the evidence should not be accepted the Tribunal concluded that if the child were to attend School A an additional teacher would be necessary.

 

Evidence relevant to the ground for refusal specified in paragraph 3(1) (b) was given by the Principal Psychologist, Head of Inclusion and Head Teacher from School A. Each of these witnesses was consistent in their evidence that School A was not suited to the ability or aptitude of the child (there being agreement that School A catered for children of the child’s age.) The school focussed on language and communication, preparing children for independent living. Children within School A were functioning at a far higher cognitive level than the child. This meant that the child would have no appropriate peer group were he to attend School A. Witness C gave evidence that the pupils within the school have minimal adult support and are expected to find their way around the school. Having regard to School A’s admissions criteria as outlined in the school handbook at A38 it was accepted that the child had both an autistic spectrum disorder and problems sleeping but the Principal Psychologist had concerns that the child would not be able to benefit from integration with mainstream schooling, that he was not compatible with the existing pupils in the school and that his level of competence was not compatible with the level of staffing and resources available to the school. Witness C was also referred to the admissions criteria for School A. In submissions the Solicitor for the Appellant suggested that Witness C seemed to be somewhat uncomfortable with the admissions criteria, describing them as “possibly out of date.” This was not the Tribunal’s view of her evidence. Witness C indicated that the third criteria (that “the child should potentially to (sic) be able to benefit from limited integration experiences”) was possibly slightly out of date. When asked about this point later in her evidence she indicated that she thought she would just change one word, substituting “inclusion” for “integration”. Witness C had reservations about the child’s ability to meet the said criteria and had big reservations regarding him meeting the final two criteria. While Witness C gave evidence to the effect that a child did not require to meet each of the admission criteria, the criteria being compared with the needs of individual children, it did seem to the tribunal that the child fell considerably short of meeting the admissions criteria. Both Witness C and Witness B also indicated that a move to School A could actually be detrimental to the child due to the gap between him and other children impacting on his ability to develop.

 

The evidence regarding the ground for refusal of placing request in paragraph 3(1) (b) provided by the said witnesses contrasted markedly with the evidence of Witness D, the Clinical Psychologist who gave evidence on behalf of the Appellant. This witness is an expert on autistic spectrum disorders of international renown and an impressive witness. He had also worked with the child, seeing him regularly. Witness D was clear in his evidence that the child was suitable for School A, while acknowledging that School B would also be suitable. Witness D gave evidence that the primary barrier to the child’s learning was autism. Witness D considered that the child would develop best in an autistic specific situation such as at School A. He considered from his knowledge of School A that the child would have an appropriate peer group within the school of children with similar profiles. He indicated that he was currently working with another child who he assessed as being at a similar cognitive level to the child. Witness C had previously given evidence in respect of the said child to the effect that while he presented challenging behaviour he showed evidence of functioning at a high cognitive level, being able to control people’s responses, add, subtract, divide & multiply and set up smart boards and computers. When the evidence of Witness C about the said child was put to Witness D he said that it was “highly possible” that The Child could function at the same developmental level in 3 years time. It did seem to the Tribunal that this child was functioning at a far higher level than The Child. For example while The Child, from the evidence of the appellant, could recite the 2 times table and some of the 3 times table, based on the appellant’s response to questions from the Tribunal seeking to ascertain his degree of understanding of the tables, it did not seem that the child could understand multiplication. Witness D was pressed regarding the child’s development age and indicated that he was at about the 4 to 6 age range, around pre-school. Of all the witnesses who offered a view on the child’s development age Witness D’s evidence was the most favourable. Witness A gave evidence that there was no suggestion that the child was functioning much beyond 2 years and 4 months, which had been the PEPr target, and Witness B’s view based on the reports he had read was the child was functioning at 3 or 4.

 

One matter Witness D and the other witnesses were in agreement on was the importance of a peer group. Witness D was clear that the child would develop faster where there was a similar peer group. Where the witnesses differed on this matter was whether there actually was a peer group for the child at School A.

 

It was argued that the child had made significant progress during his time in the Intensive Support Unit at School C Primary School and the reason for that progress was the level of support provided in the unit. While there were other possible explanations or contributory factors put forward for the progress such as behavioural improvements (from the evidence of Witness D) due to the work of Witness D and the appellant, or from the evidence of Witness A, maturation the Tribunal did believe the Education provided in the Intensive Support Unit had materially contributed to the improvement. However the Tribunal did not accept the submission that the support provided in the unit would be replicated in School A. While there were superficial similarities in relation to proposed staff ratios the education provision seemed quite different in School A.

 

The Tribunal carefully considered the evidence of each witness as well as documentary evidence related to the school (HMIE report A209-219 and the school handbook A33-61). We concluded that the most convincing evidence regarding suitability of School A came from Witness C who, as Head teacher was best able to assess whether there was a peer group for the child at School A. Witness C had a detailed knowledge of pupils in the school and of the profile of children in the class the child would join. The Tribunal did not regard it as material that Witness C had not met the child. The Tribunal would not expect a Head teacher, even of a specialist school, to meet with all prospective pupils. As indicated above there was sufficient information on the child’s needs before Witness C to enable her to conclude that the child’s needs were significantly different from other pupils in the school. The Tribunal also accepted the evidence of Witness C and Witness B that there was a risk that a placement at School A could be detrimental to the child. While the Tribunal accepted Witness D’s evidence that children develop well where there are other children they can aspire to be like, the Tribunal were satisfied that the gap between the child and other children at School A was so significant that there was at least a risk that the placement could be detrimental for the child.

 

Given the needs of the child are so different from those of other children educated at School A together with the finding that the child does not meet the admissions criteria for the school, the Tribunal found that the education normally provided at School A is not suited to the ability or aptitude of the child.

 

Having concluded that two grounds for refusing the placing request had been established the Tribunal next had to determine by virtue of s19 (5)(a)(ii) of the act whether in all the circumstances of the case it was appropriate to uphold the authority’s decision. Having already concluded that the Education normally provided at the specified school was not suited to the ability or aptitude of the child, the Tribunal considered it appropriate to uphold the authority’s decision. The Tribunal did not consider it would be appropriate to require the authority to place the child in a school that was not suited to the child. The Tribunal considered that this reason on its own was sufficient to uphold the authority’s decision. Nevertheless there were other reasons that the Tribunal considered fortified its view.

 

One of these was the additional cost to the authority. The costs of an additional teacher should the child attend School A would be approximately £50,000 and it was highly likely that an additional support assistant would be required at an additional cost of £23,000 plus on costs.

 

The other was the suitability of School B. It was accepted that the child had progressed well in a complex learning needs primary. The view of staff at School C primary school as recorded at R142 and evidenced by Witness A was that he was ready to progress to a CLN secondary school. The Tribunal heard a lot of evidence that the child would be likely to do well in a secondary school with a similar profile to School C, which could cater for the child’s complex learning needs as well as his autism. The Authority representative and Witness B both gave evidence as to the suitability of a placement in a CLN secondary school. It was clear from their evidence that pupils at School B have a similar profile to those in the said primary school including the child. Many children at School B have ASD. The Tribunal accepted the evidence (of The Authority representative and Witness B in particular) that School B is suited to the child’s needs.  Indeed this view was accepted by Witness D who described School B as excellent and able to meet the child’s needs. The Tribunal noted that Witness D’s evidence was that the child would be likely to make “slightly better” progress in an autism-specific environment such as School A. The only reservation Witness D appeared to have regarding School B became apparent towards the end of his evidence. Having given evidence that research shows a ratio of 3 pupils to 1 staff member provides the optimum support to children such as The Child when the potential staffing levels at School B were put to him by Solicitor for the Appellant he clarified that he was referring to qualified teachers. 

 

It was also clear to the Tribunal from the evidence of The Authority representative, Witness B and Witness D that the child would have an appropriate peer group at School B

 

The appellant was concerned regarding the size of the class at School B (which was stated as being five pupils for most of the week with a sixth accessing the class at times). The appellant’s concerns seemed largely to arise from her view of the child’s earlier experience in a moderate learning needs primary school. While the views of the child’s mother were certainly relevant, as stated above, the Tribunal accepted the evidence given by the professional witnesses that School B could meet the child’s needs.

 

A lot of time was spent with witnesses discussing the respective staffing ratios that the child might have at both the nominated and specified schools as well as ratios the child had experienced in the Intensive Support Unit in the CLN school and previously in a moderate learning needs school. Having reached the conclusions that School A was not suited to the ability or aptitude of the child; that there was a risk that a placement there might be detrimental to the child; and that School B would meet the child’s needs the Tribunal did not consider it helpful to directly compare the staffing ratios in the nominated or specified school, both of which had suggested staffing ratios that related to the needs of the individual children within the class. The Tribunal did, however, note that the child’s progress would be reviewed after 6-8 weeks in School B and if extra resources were necessary they would be provided. The Tribunal did not accept that there was any evidence that the authority would not resource additional staff should that be necessary.

 

Further, given the Tribunal’s findings referred to in the paragraph above, the Tribunal did not accept the submission that the child would have a better chance of developing educationally at School B.

 

The Tribunal wish to record that they were impressed by the way the appellant conducted herself with dignity throughout the hearing, giving clear evidence as to why she considered School A to be an appropriate placement for her son. The Tribunal were also satisfied that she had genuinely held concerns that the education provision offered within School B would not be suitable for the child and that he might regress there. As indicated above, these concerns appeared to be based largely upon the child’s early primary experience in a school for children with moderate learning difficulties. While there was no evidence before the Tribunal other than the appellant’s views to suggest the child was not likely to progress at School B and clear evidence that the school would meet his needs, the Tribunal noted that the authority were clear that there would be a review of the child’s progress after approximately 6 to 8 weeks in the school and if extra resources were necessary those resources would be provided. Mindful of the appellant’s genuine concerns regarding School B in the Tribunal’s view it is essential the review is undertaken and acted upon promptly. Accordingly the Tribunal trusts the authority will adhere to the said commitments made before it.

 

For all the above reasons we have reached the decision recorded above.